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TRIAD LEASING & FINANCIAL, INC.,
PLAINTIFF-COUNTERDEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
vs.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN ROGUES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation; JAMES
BLITTERSDORF, an individual; and GLENNA BLITTERSDORF-CHRISTOFFERSON,
an individual,
DEFENDANTS-COUNTERCLAIMANTS-APPELLANTS

ROCKY MOUNTAIN ROGUES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation; JAMES
BLITTERSDORF, an individual; and GLENNA BLITTERSDORF-CHRISTOFFERSON,
an individual,
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
vs.

G. ALAN MCRAE, personally, d/b/a LUND MACHINERY, an administratively dissolved
Idaho and Utah corporation,
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Respondents' briefs fail to address the real issues on appeal. Summary judgment
against Rocky Mountain was improper as the District Court did not address the initial purchase
agreement between Rocky Mountain and Lund. This agreement was not and cannot be impacted
by any agreement with Triad as it was an independent agreement.
Additionally, once removed from consideration with the Triad agreement, summary
judgment for Lund was improper on the Fraud claim by Rocky Mountain. The statements made
by Lund were possible in the agreement between Lund and Rocky Mountain and should not be
excluded pursuant parole evidence as there was no written document between Lund and Rocky
Mountain.
The District Court erroneously found Rocky Mountain in breach of contract. This error
stems from the improper interpretation of the contract by the District Court to require a payment
before April 20, 2006.
The District Court erroneously relied on the testimony of Vickie Turner for the purposes
of verifying delivery and thereby acceptance of the contract. Ms. Turner's testimony on the
matter is seriously flawed and contradicted by overwhelming evidence and even Triad's
representative's own testimony.
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ARGUMENT
In each of the briefs provided by the Respondents in this matter, the Respondents attempt
to complicate the issues on appeal and offer irrelevant arguments in an attempt to have the
rulings of the District Court upheld. The following argument will address each Respondent and
the issues on appeal relevant to that Respondent individually to clarify the questions presented.
Issues on Appeal with G. Alan Mcrae d/b/a Lund Machinery
Summary Judgment Against Rocky Mountain
In Rocky Mountain's Third-party Complaint against Lund, Rocky Mountain claims both
a breach of contract against Lund both as an individual and as an agent for Triad. (Record pg. 62)
This is additionally supported by the District Court's statements on the first day of trial when that
Court stated, "Their motion only went to whether they were parties to the Triad contract."
(Transcript pg. 44) Lund now attempts to state that the Motion for Summary Judgment applied to
all claims. (Respondent's Brief pg. 7) However, Lund ignores the remainder of the statements
made during the hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment where it clearly stated that the
motion was on agency. In that hearing, Lund also stated, " ... quite simply, we should be given
summary judgment on this breach of contract claim for the simple reason that Lund Machinery
was not a party to this contract between Triad and Mr. Blittersdorf." (Transcript pg. 5.)
In granting summary judgment for Lund, the District Court, in its original order stated
that Lund was not an agent for Triad, and therefore summary judgment would be granted. (see
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generally Memorandum Decision and Order, Record pg. 75) In that order, after discussing the
various requirements under the law and rules for summary judgment, the District Court stated,
"The contract between Rocky Mountain and Triad is clear and unambiguous. Lund is not a party
to it, and assumed no obligations under it." Id. at 80. The District Court would continue to rule
that Lund was not an agent of Triad and therefore could not have any obligations under the
contract between Triad and Rocky Mountain. Id. Throughout the entire decision, the District
Court only addresses the Triad contract and Lund as an agent.
As argued in Rocky Mountain's opening brief, an agreement was reached between rocky
Mountain and Lund before the Triad contract came into existence. The agreement is
acknowledged by Lund in its reply brief when it states, "In 2006, Lund agreed to sell the
previously rented forklift to Rocky Mountain." Respondent's Brie/pg. 2. The purchase was to be
financed through a third-party, Triad. In the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Lund
states, "All we did was sell him the vehicle. We're not a party to the transaction between Triad
and Mr. Blittersdorf. All we did is we got paid for the equipment." (Transcript pg. 24.)
The start of the entire issue is when Lund and Rocky Mountain agreed to tum the
previous lease into a purchase. (Record pg. 75.) This agreement included the credit for a portion
of the lease payments and the additional purchase of the jib boom. Id. pgs. 75-76 This agreement
was reached before any agreement or issue with Triad. Id. There were only two parties, Rocky
Mountain and Lund. This agreement was not discussed or decided in the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Lund. Evidence of this agreement could not be excluded based on the parole

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

4

evidence rule as requested by Lund because there was no written agreement. Lund is not excused
from this agreement because of Triad, because it was reached without involvement from Triad.
The District Court, in entering its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment did not
consider this separate agreement with Lund. The District Court clearly said so in the decision and
again at trial. That Court only decided that Lund was not an agent for Triad. In doing so, the
District Court left the breach of the original agreement to sell and to buy the forklift and jib still
pending.
Present Facts or Future Performance
Lund's arguments on the fraud issue of the statements made being present facts or future
performance also fail on the same reasoning as stated above. These statements were made
between Lund and Rocky Mountain, and were not communicated by Triad. This being the case,
Lund cannot then try to have the statements excluded based on the parole evidence rule. There is
no written document between Lund and Rocky Mountain and therefore parole evidence is nonexisting. Lund's arguments on the present facts or future performance also fail once removed
from the contract with Triad.
Issues on Appeal with Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc.
The District Court Committed Error in Finding Rocky Mountain in Breach
Triad claimed that Rocky Mountain breached the contract by not providing required
payments pursuant to the contract. (Record pg. 10.) In its letters to Rocky Mountain and at trial,
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Triad would argue that the breach occurred by Rocky Mouutain not providing the security
deposit at the time of signing the contract, calling it an "upfront payment." (Transcript pgs. 77,
116-117.) The District Court found Rocky Mouutain had breached the contract by not providing
this payment. (Record pg. 92.) This was again expressed to Rocky Mouutain in the letter sent
from Triad on April 11. (Transcript pg. 126.) As is clearly and unambiguously stated on the
contract, and by Triad at trial, the initial payment was due on April 20, 2006. (Record pg. 13,
Transcript pg. 131.) At the time of signing the contract, or at the time of accepting the contract,
there was no payment due. Id Triad noted that the contract itself stated a onetime payment of
zero was due upon acceptance of the contract. (Transcript pg. 150.)
By not having a payment due till April 20, 2006 and no payment due at the time of
signing the contract or accepting it, Rocky Mouutain could not have breached the agreement by
not providing required payments at any time prior to April 20, 2006. However, Triad claimed
and the District Court fouud that Rocky Mountain breached the contract prior to the April 20,
2006 date for not providing a security deposit. ( Triad's Demand letter claiming breach on April
11, 2006-Transcript pgs. 116, Record pg. 91- Rocky Mouutain's $5,600 check did not clear the
bank and this was not remedied.)

It is also clearly laid out in Rocky Mountain's brief how the District Court committed
error in finding the contract accepted by Rocky Mountain based solely on the testimony of Ms.
Turner. As noted in the opening brief, Ms. Turner testified that she could not verify exactly who
called her, saw there was no jib boom in the verification photo and that she verified if :they have
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received their 1997 Hi Reach Forklift. (Transcript at 202.) It is clearly erroneous to rely on this
one person's testimony when the volume of evidence suggests the exact opposite. Even Mr.
Wakefield stated that only "most of' the equipment was delivered. (Transcript pg. 174.)
CONCLUSION
In this case, there were two agreements reached. The first is the agreement between Lund
and Rocky Mountain for the purchase of the forklift and the jib boom. This agreement occurred
prior to any involvement with Triad and should be considered separate from that agreement. The
second agreement resulted in Triad financing Rocky Mountain's purchase.
The District Court failed to adequately address the initial agreement between Rocky
Mountain and Lund. The District Court attempted to summarily dismiss this claim by referring to
its previous order granting Lund's Motion for Summary Judgment on Lund as an agent for Triad.
As noted in this appeal, not only was that decision by the District Court clearly erroneous based
on the prior decision, the decision, if taken on the evidence, is erroneous based on the valid
claims from Rocky Mountain. Summary Judgment was improper.
The District Court also improperly interpreted the Triad lease agreement in finding a
payment due before April 20, 2006. Based on the document and testimony at trial, there clearly
was not default even possible based on Triad's claims until April 20, 2006. Triad's claim of
breach was premature and not supported by the evidence once there is a proper interpretation of
the contract.
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These erroneous errors by the District Court denied Rocky Mountain justice and should
therefore be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of May, 2009

Larren K. Covert, Esq.
Of Swafford Law Office, Chartered
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